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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Richard Alan Wilson appeals the district court’s Judgment And Commitment 
entered after a jury found him guilty on two counts of aiding and abetting trafficking in 
methamphetamine.  Wilson argues on appeal that the state did not present sufficient 
evidence for his convictions.  
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 On April 7, 2016, Regina Jones, an alleged drug dealer, contacted Mike Phillips, a 
detective with the Nampa Police Department working undercover in the special 
investigations unit, and told him “that she had just picked up two ounces of 
Methamphetamine and wanted to know if [he] wanted to get them.”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., 
p.169, L.25 – p.170, L.11; p.178, L.4 – p.179, L.15.)  She offered to sell one ounce of 
methamphetamine for $650 or two ounces for $1200.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.179, Ls.4-
18.)  Detective Phillips agreed to buy both ounces for $1200.  (Id.)  Jones and Detective 
Phillips agreed to meet at Target around 6 p.m. to make the exchange.  (2/28/2017 Trial 
Tr., p.179, L.19 – p.180, L.1.)     
 Detective Phillips went alone in his car to Target.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.2-
3.)  He wore a wire and had a team of officers surveilling the transaction.  (2/28/2017 Trial 
Tr., p.180, Ls.4-11.)  He contacted Jones before arriving.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.180, 
Ls.12-20.)  “She told [him] that she was going to be in a white Ford Expedition and the 
hood was going to be popped, and that’s how [he] could tell that she was there.”  (Id.) 
 When Detective Phillips pulled up to the white Ford Expedition, he “saw a male 
subject standing outside the front of the vehicle . . . kind of lingering around the front of 
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the vehicle looking around.”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.2-8.)  “The hood was popped.”  
(Id.)  Detective Phillips sent a text message to Jones informing her which car he was in.  
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.9-15.)     
Jones got out of the white Ford Expedition and into Detective Phillips’s car.  
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.9-22.)  They had “kind of general conversation.”  
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.16-22.)  Detective Phillips gave Jones the money, and she 
handed him “a Ziploc baggie” that “contained two smaller baggies which contained 
Methamphetamine.”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.182, Ls.9-22; p.190, Ls.9-17.)  After the 
transaction, Jones went back to the white Ford Expedition.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.191, 
Ls.11-13.)  The unidentified male “shut the hood on the car and then went and got in the 
passenger seat of the Ford Expedition.”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.190, L.23 – p.191, L.3.) 
 Detective Phillips submitted the substance he obtained from Jones to the lab for 
testing.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.194, Ls.5-24.)  The lab results showed that the first baggie 
weighed 27.76 grams, and the second baggie weighed 27.89 grams.  (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., 
p.21, Ls.13-25.)  The substances in both baggies tested positive for methamphetamine.  
(3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.23, L.2 – p.24, L.8.) 
 On April 27, 2016, Detective Phillips set up another deal with Jones: “an ounce of 
Methamphetamine for $600.”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.211, Ls.15-23; p.212, Ls.8-10.)  
Detective Phillips contacted Jones to “tell her specifically that [he] wanted an ounce” of 
methamphetamine.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.11-20.)  Jones told Detective Phillips 
“that she didn’t have it with her, that she had to go pick it up from Robert’s house.”  
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.21-23.)  Jones told Detective Phillips that she would pick 
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up the methamphetamine and then meet him at “McDonald’s off of Garrity in Nampa.”  
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.3-17.) 
 This time Detective Phillips made it to the agreed location first.  (2/28/2017 Trial 
Tr., p.214, Ls.12-24.)  He saw a four-door Nissan pull into the parking lot.  (2/28/2017 
Trial Tr., p.214, Ls.12-18.)  The same unidentified male from the first transaction was 
driving the car, and Jones was in the passenger seat.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.214, L.19 – 
p.215, L.1.)  “The male subject got out of the vehicle, out of the driver’s side, popped the 
hood, raised the hood, just like he did before.  Milled around the front.  Looked around 
while [Jones] was seated in the car for a couple minutes.”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.215, 
Ls.7-12.) 
 Detective Phillips sent Jones a text message with his location, and Jones eventually 
came over and sat in his car.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.16-23.)  She gave Detective 
Phillips “a baggie of white crystal substance” and he gave her $620.1  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., 
p.215, L.24 – p.216, L.5.)  Detective Phillips told Jones that he needed another ounce.  
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.6-11.)  In the recorded conversation, he referred to the 
methamphetamine as “dope.”  (Exhibit 9 at 01:00 – 1:08.)  Jones agreed to provide an 
additional ounce but “told [him] she would have to go back to Robert’s house and pick it 
up and bring it back to [him].”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.6-13.) 
 Jones “walked back to the Nissan where the male subject, he had already, after he 
had looked around a little bit, closed the lid and got back into the vehicle.”  (2/28/2017 
Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.20-23.)  Jones and the unidentified male left in the Nissan.  (2/28/2017 
                                            
1 As Detective Phillips explained at the trial, the agreed-upon price for the ounce of 
methamphetamine was $600, but he unintentionally included an extra $20 in the money he 
gave to Jones.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.230, Ls.6-14.) 
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Trial Tr., p.217, Ls.3-6.)  The unidentified male was driving.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.216, 
Ls.24-25.) 
 One of the officers surveilling the undercover transaction sent out a radio request 
stating he wanted the Nissan stopped.  (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.92, L.17 – p.93, L.3; p.94, 
L.16 – p.95, L.15.)  Officer Jacob Peper of the Nampa Police Department received the 
request and stopped the vehicle.  (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.52, Ls.7-12; p.53, Ls.6-19.)  The 
previously unidentified male, who was driving the vehicle, identified himself as Richard 
Alan Wilson.  (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.54, Ls.8-17.)  Jones was in the passenger seat.  
(3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.54, L.25 – p.55, L.1.)  Officer Peper conducted a search of Wilson 
and, “in his front left pants pocket, [he] found $600 cash.”  (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.55, Ls.9-
12.)  The serial numbers on the money seized from Wilson matched the serial numbers of 
the money Detective Phillips used to purchase the methamphetamine from Jones.  
(3/1/2017, Trial Tr., p.129, L.3 – p.130, L.4.) 
 Detective Phillips submitted to the lab the substance he received from Jones.  
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.219, Ls.14-22.)  The substance weighed 25.91 grams.  (3/1/2017 
Trial Tr., p.31, L.13 – p.32, L.17.)  It also tested positive for methamphetamine.  (3/1/2017 
Trial Tr., p.32, L.23 – p.33, L.12.)   
 A few days after the April 27 transaction, Wilson contacted the police “wanting to 
come and try and recover the money that had been seized.”  (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.68, L.21 
– p.69, L.11.)  In a video-recorded interview with law enforcement, Wilson “stated that he 
had received that money from work and through loans from family and such.”  (3/1/2017 
Trial Tr., p.70, L.24 – p.71, L.2; see State’s Exhibit 5 at 01:48 – 02:16.)  And Wilson wrote 
and signed a witness statement to that effect.  (State’s Exhibit 6.) 
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 Wilson also stated that Jones had mentioned that law enforcement wanted her “to 
flip.”  (State’s Exhibit 5 at 07:50 – 08:14.)  One of the officers asked Wilson, “are you in 
the game, then?”  (Id. at 08:34 – 08:36.)  Wilson responded, “sort of.”  (Id. at 08:37 – 
08:39).  When asked to elaborate, Wilson explained that he goes with Jones “when she 
does deals.”  (Id. at 08:44 – 08:48.)  Wilson told the officers that Jones compensates him 
with free lunch and free “dope.”  (Id. at 09:00 – 09:10.)  He also admitted that he uses 
“dope.”  (Id.)  Wilson stated that the reason he goes with Jones is “protection, mainly.”  
(Id. at 09:10 – 09:17.) 
 The State charged Wilson with two counts of aiding and abetting Jones in 
trafficking methamphetamine, one count for the transaction on April 7, 2016, and one count 
for the transaction on April 27, 2016.  (R., pp.7-8.)  A jury found Wilson guilty on both 
counts.  (R., pp.139-40.)  The district court sentenced Wilson to ten years’ imprisonment 
with three years fixed.  (R., pp.155-56.)  Wilson timely appealed.  (R., pp.157-62.)       





Wilson states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Was there sufficient evidence to support Mr. Wilson’s convictions of two 
counts of aiding and abetting trafficking in methamphetamine? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.6) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 








Wilson Has Failed To Show That The State Did Not Present Sufficient Evidence  
For His Convictions 
 
A. Introduction 
 The jury’s convictions of Wilson on both counts of aiding and abetting the 
trafficking of methamphetamine are supported by substantial evidence.  Wilson 
unsuccessfully attacks three conclusions reached by the jury: (1) Jones represented the 
methamphetamine sold on April 27 weighed one ounce; (2) Wilson intended to aid and 
abet the sale of methamphetamine on April 27; and (3) Wilson knew that the substance 
sold on April 7 and April 27 was methamphetamine. 
 The state proved that Jones represented the methamphetamine sold on April 27 
weighed one ounce through the testimony of Detective Phillips, the individual to whom 
Jones made the representation.  He testified that, prior to the transaction, he asked Jones 
specifically for one ounce of methamphetamine and she agreed to get “it” for him.  That is 
substantial evidence that Jones represented the methamphetamine weighed one ounce, 
even under Wilson’s definition of representation as “a presentation of fact—either by 
words or conduct—made to induce someone to act.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.19.)   
 The state proved that Wilson intended to aid and abet the trafficking of 
methamphetamine on April 27 by showing his extensive participation in the sale. Wilson 
provided transportation to and from the transaction, sent the signal to the buyer that they 
had arrived, provided protection for the transaction, and walked away with virtually all of 
the money paid for the methamphetamine.  Contrary to Wilson’s assertion, the state did 
not need to prove that he knew that Jones represented the methamphetamine weighed an 
ounce because the only relevance of the representation was to prove the determinative 
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amount of methamphetamine under the statute, and the state does not need to prove 
knowledge of the amount to secure a conviction for trafficking methamphetamine. 
 The state proved that Wilson knew the substance was methamphetamine through 
circumstantial evidence. Specifically, the state presented evidence that Wilson knew Jones 
distributed methamphetamine, intimately participated in the sale of the methamphetamine 
on both occasions, received the going-rate for an ounce of methamphetamine after the 
second transaction, and lied about the source of the drug money to the police.  All of that 
evidence belies Wilson’s claim that “[t]he jury was presented with no evidence that he 
knew Ms. Jones sold methamphetamine.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.21.)       
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “This Court ‘will uphold a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict so 
long as there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could conclude that 
the prosecution proved all essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  
State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 572, 388 P.3d 583, 586 (2017) (quoting State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009)).  “Evidence is substantial if a 
‘reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed 
point of fact has been proven.’”  Severson, 147 Idaho at 712, 215 P.3d at 432 (quoting State 
v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 135, 937 P.2d 960, 961 (Ct. App. 1997) (brackets omitted)).  
This Court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution in 
determining whether substantial evidence exists” and “will not substitute [its] own 
judgment for that of the jury on matters such as the credibility of witnesses, the weight to 
be given to certain evidence, and the ‘reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 285, 77 P.3d 956, 974 (2003)). 
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C. The State Presented Substantial Evidence Upon Which A Rational Trier Of Fact 
Could Convict Wilson On Both Counts Of Aiding And Abetting The Trafficking 
Of Methamphetamine 
 
 The state presented substantial evidence that Wilson aided and abetted the 
trafficking of methamphetamine on April 7, 2016, and April 27, 2016.  The district court 
instructed the jury that, in order to convict Wilson on each count, the state must prove five 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt:  (1) on the relevant date, (2) in the state of Idaho, (3) 
“the defendant aided and abetted Regina L. Jones in the delivery of methamphetamine,” 
(4) “the defendant knew it was methamphetamine,” and (5) “Either: (a) the quantity 
delivered was at least twenty-eight (28) grams . . . Or (b) the quantity delivered was 
represented to be one ounce or more of methamphetamine.”  (Aug., pp.38-39 (underlining 
in original).)  Wilson did not take issue with that characterization of the elements of the 
crime in the district court and has not done so on appeal.  Instead, Wilson argues that the 
state failed to present substantial evidence to show that (1) the methamphetamine in the 
April 27, 2016 transaction weighed at least 28 grams; (2) Wilson had the requisite intent 
with respect to the April 27, 2016 transaction; and (3) Wilson knew that the substance 
Jones sold in either transaction was methamphetamine.  He is wrong. 
1. Substantial Evidence Showed The Methamphetamine Weighed At Least 28 Grams 
The state presented substantial evidence at trial that the methamphetamine used in 
the transaction on April 27, 2016, weighed at least 28 grams.  A person can be convicted 
of trafficking methamphetamine when the transaction involves “twenty-eight (28) grams 
or more of methamphetamine.”  I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4).  Pursuant to the statute, “the weight 
of the controlled substance as represented by the person selling or delivering it is 
determinative if the weight as represented is greater than the actual weight of the controlled 
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substance.”  I.C. § 37-2732B(c).  This means the state can prove the weight element of the 
crime either by (1) showing the actual weight is at least 28 grams or (2) showing that the 
“person selling or delivering” the methamphetamine “represented” that it weighed at least 
28 grams.  See id.   
For the April 27 transaction, the state used the second approach by offering 
substantial evidence that Jones “represented” that the methamphetamine sold on April 27 
weighed more than 28 grams, I.C. § 37-2732B(c).  Wilson does not dispute that Jones both 
sold and delivered methamphetamine to Detective Phillips on April 27, which means, as 
the “person selling or delivering” the methamphetamine, Jones’s representation of the 
weight of the methamphetamine was “determinative.”  Id.  Detective Phillips testified that, 
in discussing the terms of the transaction prior to the exchange, he “specifically” told Jones 
that he “wanted an ounce” of methamphetamine.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212 Ls.18-20.)  
He also testified as to what Jones said in response: “She told me that she didn’t have it with 
her, that she had to go pick it up from Robert’s house.”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.21-
23 (emphases added).)   
A rational trier of fact would, or at the very least could, conclude from Detective 
Phillips’s testimony that Jones was telling Detective Phillips that she had exactly what he 
had requested (i.e., an ounce of methamphetamine) and she was willing to sell “it” to him 
but she had to go pick “it” up first.  This representation by Jones that the methamphetamine 
she sold Detective Phillips on April 27 weighed an ounce satisfied the statute’s 28-gram 
threshold.  (See 3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.35, Ls.15-17 (lab scientist testifying that “[t]here are 
28.35 grams in an ounce”); 3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.171, L.21 (district court instructing the 
jury that “[o]ne ounce equals 28.35 grams”).)  
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The jury also heard other evidence that supported the conclusion that Jones 
“represented” to Detective Phillips that the methamphetamine weighed at least 28 grams.  
Detective Phillips, the individual to whom Jones made the representation, understood from 
the conversation that he “was supposed to be getting an ounce of Methamphetamine for 
$600.”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.3-10.)  In addition, the “going rate” for an ounce of 
methamphetamine at the time of the deal was $600—the exact amount for which Jones 
agreed to sell the methamphetamine.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.177, Ls.7-9.) 
The state does not disagree with Wilson that “representation” can be defined as “a 
presentation of fact—either by words or by conduct—made to induce someone to act, esp. 
to enter into a contract.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.19 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, (10th 
ed. 2014)).)  But that definition describes perfectly Jones’s behavior and statements as 
explained by Detective Phillips.  Detective Phillips told Jones “specifically that [he] wanted 
an ounce” of methamphetamine.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.18-20.)  Rather than tell 
Detective Phillips that she did not have an ounce or would be providing a different amount, 
Jones responded that “[s]he didn’t have it with her, that she had to go pick it up from 
Robert’s house.”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.21-23 (emphases added).)  Then she met 
with Detective Phillips later that same day and gave him methamphetamine in exchange 
for $600, the going rate for an ounce of methamphetamine.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.177, 
Ls.4-9; p.212, Ls.24-25; p.215, L.24 – p.216, L.5.)  Both Detective Phillips and the jury 
reasonably concluded, based on Jones’s words and conduct, that Jones represented as fact 
to Detective Phillips that she could get “an ounce of Methamphetamine” and sell it to him 
“for $600.”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.212, Ls.8-10.)  Such a “represent[ation] by the person 
 
 12 
selling or delivering” the methamphetamine is all that the statute requires.  I.C. § 37-
2732B(c).            
Wilson focuses on the recorded conversation that took place at the time of the 
transaction, arguing that “there were no statements made during the transaction from 
which the jury could infer that Ms. Jones was representing the methamphetamine to weigh 
an ounce.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.20 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).)  But that is a red 
herring.  Jones made the representation via cell phone before the transaction and recorded 
conversation took place.2  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.211, L.15 – p.212, L.23.)  That is 
sufficient to meet the statute’s 28-gram threshold; nothing in the statute requires the 
representation to be made at the exact time the methamphetamine changes hands.  See I.C. 
§ 37-2732B(c). 
With respect to the cell-phone conversation that occurred prior to the transaction, 
Wilson simply notes “that if the State had merely called Ms. Jones as a witness it could, 
presumably, have provided sufficient context by having her testify as to the terms of her 
deal with Detective Phillips, including what statements were made during their unrecorded 
and unmonitored telephone calls.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.20 n.5.)  Even if Jones would have 
agreed to testify and could have provided additional information about the terms of the 
deal,3 that does not make her testimony necessary for the state to prove the weight element 
                                            
2 Wilson’s suggestion that Detective Phillips went into the transaction on nothing but an 
“assumption that it was the amount he asked for” finds no support in the record.  
(Appellant’s brief, p.20.)  Detective Phillips explained in his testimony exactly why he 
believed he was purchasing one ounce of methamphetamine: Jones agreed to sell him one 
ounce of methamphetamine.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.211, L.15 – p.212, L.25.) 
 
3 Jones, of course, had a Fifth Amendment right not to testify on behalf of the state that she 
agreed to sell Detective Phillips an ounce of methamphetamine. 
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of the offense.  The statute does not dictate how the state must prove that the seller 
represented the weight—much less demand that the seller herself testify that she made the 
representation.  See I.C. § 37-2732B(c).    
For this element of the crime, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the methamphetamine sold on April 27 weighed more than 28 grams.  The statute expressly 
allows the state to prove  the weight by showing that the “person selling or delivering” the 
methamphetamine represented the weight to be at least 28 grams.  I.C. § 37-2732B(c).  The 
state did so through the testimony of Detective Phillips, the only individual besides Jones 
involved in the relevant conversation, who testified that he specifically asked Jones for one 
ounce of methamphetamine, and that Jones agreed to provide “it.”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., 
p.211, L.15 – p.212, L.25.)  His testimony and the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction constituted substantial evidence from which the jury could—and did—find that 
Jones represented the weight of the methamphetamine to be more than 28 grams.       
2. Substantial Evidence Showed Wilson Had The Requisite Intent 
The state presented substantial evidence to show that Wilson had the requisite intent 
to support the state’s aiding and abetting theory of liability for the April 27 transaction.  In 
Idaho, the law makes no distinction between a person who directly commits a crime and a 
person who intentionally aids and abets its commission.  I.C. § 19-1430; see State v. 
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 379, 247 P.3d 582, 606 (2010).  “To ‘aid and abet’ means to 
assist, facilitate, promote, encourage, counsel, solicit, or incite the commission of a crime.”  
State v. Smith, 161 Idaho 782, 787, 391 P.3d 1252, 1257 (2017); see I.C. § 19-1430.  “To 
be an aider and abettor one must share the criminal intent of the principal; there must be a 
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community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.”  State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 
386, 716 P.2d 1152, 1158 (1985).   
The evidence presented at trial proved that Wilson and Jones acted with “a 
community of purpose in the unlawful undertaking.”  Id.  Wilson confessed, on a video 
played to the jury, that he “goes with [Jones] when she does deals” to provide “protection.”  
(Exhibit 5 at 08:45 – 09:17.)  He admitted that, in exchange for his services, Jones provides 
Wilson with “lunch” and “dope.”  (Id.)   
Wilson’s description of his role in the selling of methamphetamine matched his 
behavior on April 27.  Wilson drove Jones to the meetup location.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., 
p.214, L.19 – p.215, L.1.)  Wilson got out of the car first and “[l]ooked around . . . for a 
couple of minutes” before Jones got out of the car.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.7-12.)  
After the transaction, Wilson drove Jones away from the scene of the crime.  (2/28/2017 
Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.20-25.)  The jury could readily infer from Wilson’s role in providing 
transportation and protection for Jones that he and Jones shared the same intent: to sell 
methamphetamine. 
But the evidence presented at the trial also showed that Wilson was a much more 
significant part of the methamphetamine-selling team than he admitted in the video-
recorded interview.  It was Wilson—not Jones—who propped up the hood of the car as a 
sign to Detective Phillips that they had his methamphetamine ready for sale.  (2/28/2017 
Trial Tr., p.215, Ls.7-12; see 2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.180, Ls.12-20.)  It was Wilson—not 
Jones—from whom Officer Peper seized $600 of the duo’s ill-gotten gains.  (3/1/2017 Trial 
Tr., p.55, Ls.5-12.)  And it was Wilson—not Jones—who went to the police station, 
claimed that the drug money belonged to him, and told the officers that he obtained the 
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money from work and family loans even though the serial numbers matched the money 
Detective Phillips used to purchase the methamphetamine from Jones.  (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., 
p.68, L.20 – p.76, L.21; p.129, L.11 – p.130, L.4; Exhibits 5-6.)  Wilson’s substantial 
participation in the sale of the methamphetamine strongly evinces “a community of 
purpose” between Wilson and Jones and shows that Wilson “share[d] the criminal intent 
of the principal.”  Scroggins, 110 Idaho at 386, 716 P.2d at 1158. 
Wilson erroneously asserts that the state had to show that he specifically intended 
to aid and abet trafficking the exact purported amount of methamphetamine by “prov[ing] 
that Mr. Wilson knew the amount of methamphetamine Ms. Jones represented.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.11 (capitalization altered, underlining omitted).)  That is inconsistent 
with Idaho law.  In trafficking cases, “the state is required to prove the amount of the 
controlled substance, but not knowledge of the amount.”  State v. Barraza-Martinez, 139 
Idaho 624, 626, 84 P.3d 560, 562 (Ct. App. 2003).4  And because the state does not need 
to prove knowledge of the amount to convict a principal of trafficking methamphetamine, 
the state does not need to prove knowledge of the amount when convicting an aider and 
abettor of the same crime.  See State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 204, 75 P.3d 1209, 
1214 (Ct. App. 2003). 
                                            
4 Although Barraza-Martinez was a cocaine trafficking case, the court’s analysis and 
holding applies equally to methamphetamine trafficking, which is in the same section and 
has virtually identical wording.  Compare I.C. § 37-2732B(2), with I.C. § 37-2732B(4); 
see also State v. Stefani, 142 Idaho 698, 704, 132 P.3d 455, 461 (Ct. App. 2005) (observing 
Barraza-Martinez generally held that “ignorance of the quantity of the substance possessed 
. . . is immaterial to a defendant’s culpability for trafficking in a controlled substance”).  
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court’s pattern jury instruction for trafficking 
methamphetamine requires the state to prove the amount of methamphetamine but not that 
the defendant knew the amount.  See ICJI 406D; see also State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512, 
514, 129 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Ct. App. 2005) (“The pattern Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions 
are presumptively correct.”). 
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In Romero-Garcia, the state convicted Romero-Garcia of aiding and abetting the 
failure to affix illegal drug tax stamps.  139 Idaho at 203, 75 P.3d at 1213.  He argued on 
appeal that “the jury instructions improperly failed to require the jury to find that Romero-
Garcia knew the required tax stamps were not affixed to the cocaine.”  139 Idaho at 203, 
75 P.3d at 1213.  The Idaho Court of Appeals looked to the mental state required by the 
underlying offense to determine whether an aider and abettor must know whether the 
stamps were affixed.  Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho at 204, 75 P.3d at 1214 (“The mental state 
required is generally the same as that required for the underlying offense . . . .”).  After 
reviewing the relevant statutes, the court found that “a person who fails to affix the illegal 
drug tax stamps becomes strictly liable for the omission.”  Id.  Because there was no 
knowledge requirement to convict a principal of failing to affix a tax stamp, the court held 
the state did not have to prove knowledge to convict an aider and abettor.  Id.    
Similarly, the mental state required by the underlying offense here does not include 
knowledge of the amount of methamphetamine, Barraza-Martinez, 139 Idaho at 626, 84 
P.3d at 562, which means it is not an element of aiding and abetting the underlying offense, 
see Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho at 204, 75 P.3d at 1214.  This, in turn, means the state did 
not need to prove that Wilson knew Jones represented the methamphetamine to weigh an 
ounce.  Both the jury instructions, to which Wilson did not object, and the 
methamphetamine trafficking statute make clear that the relevance of Jones’s 
representation was simply to prove the “determinative” amount of the methamphetamine.  
I.C. § 37-2732B(c).  Specifically, the jury instructions explained that the state could prove 
the 28-gram weight element of the crime “Either” (1) by proving the actual “quantity 
delivered was at least twenty eight” grams “Or” (2) “the quantity delivered was represented 
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to be one ounce or more of methamphetamine.”  (Aug. pp.38-39 (underlining in original).)  
Thus, the state had to prove that Jones represented the methamphetamine to be at least one 
ounce to meet the 28-gram threshold of the trafficking statute but did not have to connect 
that representation to Wilson’s knowledge or intent.  See Barraza-Martinez, 139 Idaho at 
626, 84 P.3d at 562. 
 Wilson cites Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), to support his 
argument (Appellant’s brief, pp.14-15), but the holding of that decision does no such thing.  
In Rosemond, the Court addressed what intent the government must show when it accuses 
a defendant of aiding and abetting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which prohibits using 
or carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking crime.  134 S. Ct. at 1243.  The question 
arose “from the compound nature of that provision,” which requires the prosecutor to prove 
a predicate drug-trafficking crime and the use or carrying of a gun during the drug 
trafficking crime.  Id. at 1245.  The Court repeatedly emphasized the dual nature of the 
crime charged.  See, e.g., id. at 1245-46, 1248 (referring to the crime at issue as 
“compound,” a “two-part incident,” a “combination crime,” and a “double-barreled 
crime”).  The Court held that “the intent must go to the specific and entire crime charged—
so here, to the full scope (predicate crime plus gun use).”  Id. at 1248.  Accordingly, rather 
than merely have the intent to commit a drug trafficking offense (where a gun happens to 
be used), the defendant must have “advance knowledge that a confederate would use or 
carry a gun during the crime’s commission.”  Id. at 1243. 
Unlike the crime at issue in Rosemond, aiding and abetting the trafficking of 
methamphetamine is not a “combination crime” because it does not require proof of a 
predicate offense.  See State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 978, 188 P.3d 912, 920 (2008) 
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(“[A]iding and abetting is not a separate offense from the substantive crime.”).  And 
trafficking methamphetamine does not have two parts (e.g., drugs and guns); the full scope 
of the crime is simply selling methamphetamine.  Thus, even under Rosemond, in order to 
prove intent, the state needed to prove only that Wilson knew that Jones was selling 
methamphetamine and intentionally assisted in that criminal activity.  See, e.g., 134 S. Ct. 
at 1249. 
Wilson reads Rosemond differently.   He cites the U.S. Supreme Court’s language 
that the jury must find the “defendant has chosen, with full knowledge, to participate in the 
illegal scheme,” id. at 1250, and suggests the state could only prove he had “full 
knowledge” here if it proves he had advanced knowledge of the purported amount of the 
methamphetamine being sold (Appellant’s brief, p.14).  But nothing in Rosemond suggests 
that “full knowledge” for the aider and abettor means even more knowledge than required 
to convict the principal.  Nor could a U.S. Supreme Court decision interpreting federal 
statutes overturn the Idaho Court of Appeals’ Romero-Garcia decision or this Court’s 
repeated holdings that, under Idaho law, “there are no additional elements the State must 
prove” to show accomplice, rather than principal, liability.  State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 
445, 464, 272 P.3d 417, 436 (2012) (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 978, 188 P.3d 
912, 920 (2008)).  Because the state does not need to prove knowledge of the amount of 
methamphetamine being trafficked to convict a principal, Barraza-Martinez, 139 Idaho at 
626, 84 P.3d at 562, the “full knowledge” required to convict someone accused of aiding 
and abetting the trafficking of methamphetamine cannot possibly include knowledge of the 
amount, see Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 464, 272 P.3d at 436.  
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The other federal decisions Wilson cites are distinguishable because the 
government in those cases charged the defendants with conspiracy to commit drug 
trafficking rather than as aiders and abettors.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.).  In conspiracy 
cases, the criminal act is the making of the agreement, not the actual commission of the 
underlying crime.  See, e.g., State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 12-13, 333 P.3d 112, 123-24 
(2014).  And under federal conspiracy law, at least as interpreted by one of the cases Wilson 
cites, the government must prove the defendant “could have reasonably foreseen a 
distribution conspiracy involving more than” the quantity of the drug required for the 
underlying offense.  United States v. Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 2007).5  
No such requirement exists in Idaho’s aiding and abetting law.  Instead, “[t]he mental state 
required is generally the same as that required for the underlying offense—the aider and 
abettor must share the criminal intent of the principal and there must be community of 
purpose in the unlawful undertaking.”  Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho at 204, 75 P.3d at 1214.  
Here, because the underlying offense does not require that a principal know or intend to 
                                            
5 Wilson cites two other federal decisions related to conspiracy charges, neither of which 
support his argument that “co-conspirators must have knowledge of quantity.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.15-16.)  In United States v. Hayes, 342 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2003), the 
government charged the defendant with conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of crack 
cocaine and pointed to two separate drug transactions that each involved approximately 45 
grams of crack cocaine.  Id. at 386-87.  The Fifth Circuit found “the Government’s 
circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove that [the defendant] was involved in the 
[second] transaction,” which meant it was not part of the charged conspiracy at all and 
could not be added toward the 50 grams of crack cocaine required by the statute.  Id. at 
389-92.  The court said nothing about the defendant needing to have knowledge of the 
specific amount of crack cocaine used in the transactions.  Wilson’s other case is even 
further afield.  See United States v. Gomez-Rosario, 418 F.3d 90, 104 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(holding, without mentioning knowledge required by defendant, that the district court did 
not constructively amend the indictment by allowing the jury to determine the drug 
quantity, in part, because “[n]o specific drug quantity needs to be proven for a jury to 
convict a defendant of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute”).       
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traffic the specific amount of methamphetamine purportedly sold, Barraza-Martinez, 139 
Idaho at 626, 84 P.3d at 562, the state did not need to prove that Wilson knew the amount 
of methamphetamine purportedly sold—either through knowledge of Jones’s 
representation or otherwise. 
3. Substantial Evidence Showed Wilson Knew Jones Was Selling Methamphetamine 
The state presented substantial evidence that Wilson knew the identity of the 
substance Jones sold to Detective Phillips.  In order to find Wilson guilty on each count of 
trafficking methamphetamine, the jury had to find that Wilson knew the substance that 
Jones sold on April 7 and April 27 was methamphetamine.  (Aug., pp.38-39.)  “This 
knowledge ‘may be proved by direct evidence or may be inferred from the circumstances.’”  
Goggin, 157 Idaho at 7, 333 P.3d at 118 (quoting State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 65, 
122 P.3d 321, 324 (Ct. App. 2005)).  A rational trier of fact could infer from the 
circumstances surrounding the April 7 and April 27 transactions that Wilson knew Jones 
sold Detective Phillips methamphetamine. 
The jury could reasonably infer that Wilson knew that Jones was a 
methamphetamine dealer.  Wilson confessed in his video interview that Jones provides him 
with free “dope” in exchange for “protection” for Jones “when she does deals.”  (State’s 
Exhibit 5 at 08:35 – 09:17.)  Although dope can be a generic term that refers to any “illicit, 
habit-forming, or narcotic drug,” Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dope (last visited March 26, 2018), nothing 
in the record suggests Jones distributed any illegal substance other than methamphetamine.   
In addition, and contrary to Wilson’s assertion (Appellant brief, p.21), “dope” was 
identified as methamphetamine during the trial.  In the audio recording of the second 
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transaction, Detective Phillips referred to methamphetamine as “dope” when he asked 
Jones for an additional ounce.  (Exhibit 9 at 01:00 – 1:08; see 2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.216, 
Ls.6-11.)  Jones knew exactly what Detective Phillips meant: she agreed to provide an 
additional ounce but told him she would have to go back to her methamphetamine supplier 
and “pick it up and bring it back to [him].”  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.216, Ls.6-13.) 
The jury could also reasonably infer that Wilson knew Jones sold 
methamphetamine to Detective Phillips based on Wilson’s extensive participation in the 
drug sales and his sharing in a significant portion of the proceeds.  Wilson rode with Jones 
and the methamphetamine to and from the April 7 transaction and drove Jones and the 
methamphetamine to and from the April 27 transaction.  (2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.4-
8; p.190, L.23 – p.191, L.10; p.214, Ls.12-24; p.216, Ls.20-25.)  He used the hood of their 
vehicle on both occasions to inform Detective Phillips that they had his methamphetamine.  
(2/28/2017 Trial Tr., p. 180, Ls.12-20; p.181, Ls.4-8; p.190, L.23 – p.191, L.3; p.215, Ls.7-
12; p.216, Ls.20-23.)   At both transactions, Wilson stood out in front of the car “lingering 
around”—presumably providing the confessed “protection” for the drug deal.  (2/28/2017 
Trial Tr., p.181, Ls.4-8; p.215, Ls.7-12; State’s Exhibit 5 at 08:35 – 09:17.)  And Officer 
Peper found $600 of the $620 of drug money on Wilson shortly after the second transaction.  
(3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.55, Ls.5-12; p.129, L.11 – p.130, L.4.)  Given Wilson’s intimate 
participation in both sales of the methamphetamine and his reaping 97% of the reward from 
the second sale, it strains credulity to suggest he was completely ignorant of the product 
being sold. 
The amount of money Wilson received also supports the conclusion that Wilson 
knew Jones had sold methamphetamine.  Wilson confessed in the video played to the jury 
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that he had some involvement in the drug trade and that he uses “dope,” which, as explained 
above, referred to methamphetamine in the context of the trial.  (State’s Exhibit 5 at 08:35 
– 09:17; 3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.76, Ls.7-13.)  The jury also heard that $600, the amount 
found on Wilson, was the “going rate . . . for an ounce of Methamphetamine.”  (2/28/2017 
Trial Tr., p.177, Ls.4-9.)  Although that testimony did not come from Wilson, the jury 
could reasonably infer that an admitted participant in the drug trade who also uses 
methamphetamine would know the street price for methamphetamine. 
Moreover, Wilson’s failed attempt to reclaim the seized money suggests that he 
fully understood Jones had sold Detective Phillips methamphetamine.  Wilson told the 
police that he received the money from work and family loans.  (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.70, 
L.24 – p.71, L.2; State’s Exhibit 5 at 01:48 – 02:16; State’s Exhibit 6.)  But the state put 
on evidence showing that the serial numbers on the money seized from Wilson matched 
the serial numbers on the money Detective Phillips used to purchase methamphetamine 
from Jones.  (3/1/2017 Trial Tr., p.129, L.11 – p.130, L.4.)  The jury could reasonably infer 
that Wilson misrepresented the source of the funds because he knew Jones sold Detective 
Phillips methamphetamine and wanted to avoid facing criminal charges.            
In sum, Wilson accompanied a known methamphetamine dealer to two different 
clandestine transactions, popped the hood of the car prior to each transaction to inform the 
buyer of their presence, lingered around to provide protection while the transactions took 
place, closed the hood after each transaction, walked away from the second transaction 
with the going-rate for an ounce of methamphetamine in his pocket, and then lied to the 
police as to the source of his ill-gotten funds.  Given those circumstances, the jury could 
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reasonably conclude that Wilson knew the substance being sold in each transaction was 
methamphetamine.         
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the Judgment And 
Commitment entered upon a jury’s guilty verdict against Wilson on two counts of aiding 
and abetting the trafficking of methamphetamine. 
 DATED this 4th day of April, 2018. 
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